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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
PACIFIC METALS COMPANY,
DIVISION OF A.M. CASTLE
& COMPANY, a corporation,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
TRACY-COLLINS BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY, a corporation,
and

Defendant and Third Party
Plaintiff, and Appellant,

BANK OF SALT LAKE,

Defendant and Cross-Plaintiff,

vs.
TRACY-COLLINS BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY, a corporation,

Case No.
11083

Defendant and Third Party
Plaintiff, and Appellant,

vs.
OLYMPUS HEATING AND AIR
CONDITIONING, a corporation,

Third-Party Defendant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from a judgment of the
Third District Court of Salt Lake County,
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiff Pacific Metals
Co. against the Defendants Tracy-Collins Bank and
Trust Co., hereinafter referred as Tracy, and the
Bank of Salt Lake for the conversion of a check in
1

the principal amount of $5,321.70, interest and costs.
(R. 1-4)

On or about October 18, 1965, Mayne Plumbing
and Heating Co., hereinafter referred to as Mayne,
issued its check, the check in question, drawn on the
Bank of Salt Lake and payable to Olympus Heating
and Air Condition, hereinafter referred as Olympus, and Pacific Metals Co., as joint payees in the
amount of $5,321.70, and delivered it to Olympus.
An employee of the latter stamped the check with a
stamp as follows: (R. 29-37)
PAY TO THE ORDER OF
TRACY-COLLINS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
SALT LAKE CITY, UT AH
FOR DEPOSIT ONLY
OLYMPUS HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING
PAYROLL ACCOUNT
02 12 605 0

The check was then deposited with the Defendant Tracy without the endorsement of Pacific Metals Co. Tracy credited the account of Olympus and
then forwarded the check through regular banking
channels for collection to the Bank of Salt Lake having stamped on it:
31-61 PAY ANY BANK 31-61
P.E.G.
TRACY-COLLINS
BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
31-61 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 31-61

(R.

2

29-37)

Opon receipt of the check by the Bank of Salt
Lake, it transferred funds in the face amount of the
check to the collecting bank Tracy, after debiting
the account of Mayne. (R. 29-37)
The Plaintiff Pacific Metals not having received any of the funds from the check, brought this
action against both Tracy and the Bank of Salt Lake
for recovery of the face amount of the check. The
Bank of Salt Lake filed its Cross-Complaint against
Tracy, alleging that, if Plaintiff obtained judgment
against it for any amount of the check, the Bank of
Salt Lake is entitled to judgment against Tracy for
the same amount, and Tracy filed a counter-claim
against the Bank of Salt Lake, alleging that, if
Plaintiff obtained judgment against it for any
amount of the check, then Tracy is entitled to judgment against the Bank of Salt Lake for the same
amount. (R. 1-4, 11-13, 37-38)
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge of
the District Court of Salt Lake County, granted a
Summary Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and
against the Defendant Tracy for a conversion of
the check in the sum of $5,978.41 interest and costs
denied the Defendant Tracy's Motion for Summary
.Judgment against the Plaintiff, denied the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against the
Defendant Bank of Salt Lake and granted the Bank
of Salt Lake's Motion for Summary Judgment
3

against the Defendant Bank of Salt Lake and granted the Bank of Salt Lake's Motion for Summary
Judgment against Tracy and the Plaintiff no causes
of actions. (R. 113-114, 143-144)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendant Tracy seeks to reverse Plaintiff's Summary Judgment, a reversal of the Judgment denying the Defendant Tracy's Motion for
Summary Judgment against the Plaintiff Pacific
Metals Co. and an Order directing the District
Court to enter Judgment in favor of the Defendant
Tracy and against the Plaintiff Pacific Metals Co.
(R. 135-136)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mayne, a depositor of the Bank of Salt Lake, and
not a party to this lawsuit, had a contract for certain work to be performed on the East High School
in Salt Lake City, Utah. Olympus, a depositor of
Tracy, was one on Mayne's subcontractors on that
particular job. (Brown dep. 3-5, Stott dep. 3-5)
Olympus purchased materials from the Plaintiff Pacific Metals and others for use in the performance of its sub-contract with Mayne. It also had
a payroll, overhead, purchase of equipment and other expenses to meet in connection with this job.
(Stott dep. R 12, 22, 25)
It was also indebted, at the time of the East
4

High job, to Plaintiff Pacific Metals for materials
furnished for use on other jobs (Williams' dep. R-6).
Some time in April or May, 1965, near the inception of its East High job, Olympus agreed with
the Plaintiff Pacific Metals that both their names
would appear as co-payees on all checks issued to
Olympus by Mayne. (R. 47-49) (Stott's dep. R 5-6,
Williams dep. R 4-7)
Mayne agreed to the arrangement, and thereafter all check issued and delivered to Olympus by
Mayne carried the names of Pacific Metals and
Olympus as joint payees. At the time Pacific Metals
and Olympus agreed to this arrangement, they did
not have an agreement as to the amount each would
receive from the checks when issued. This was to be
determined by future negotiation by them after the
issuance and delivery of the checks to Olympus. (R.
47-49, Williams' dep. R 7-8, 16-17, 21-25; Stott's
dep. R 7, 10-12)
Several checks were delivered to Olympus prior
to the check in question, and in each instance Olympus and the Plaintiff Pacific Metals, after delivery,
negotiated with each other as to the division of the
proceeds of the check. The percentages taken by each
always varied. (R. 47-49, Williams' dep. R 7-8, 1617, Stott's dep. R 6, 24-27, 29, 30, 37)
The check in question was not endorsed by the
Plaintiff Pacific Metals, nor did it receive any portion of the money represented by the check.
5

After the check was delivered to Olympus, instead of subjecting its division to negotiation with
Plaintiff, Olympus, as its owner and the owner of
the funds represented by it, deposited it in its account with the Defendant Tracy and immediately,
by check, drew on its funds, and the Defendant Tracy paid out all of the deposited amount to the holders
of Olympus checks. (R. 7 4-75)
Olympus never assigned any of the benefits or
money payable from Mayne to Plaintiff, nor was an
assignment agreed to, nor did Plaintiff have an
agreed interest in any amount or any interest in the
check nor the funds represented by the check. It
merely had a right to negotiate with Olympus, after
issuance, as to the division thereof. (R. 47-49, Williams' dep. R 4, 7-8, 16-17, 21-22, 23-25)
Kenneth L. Williams, the Plaintiff Pacific Metals' Assistant District Manager, and Clark B. Stott,
President of Olympus, represented their respective
companies in reaching the agreement under consideration (Stott's deposition R. 2-4; Williams' deposition R. 2-8)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUM MARY
JUDGMENT AND IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Plaintiff Pacific Metals claims that it had
an agreement with Olympus that it was to receive
6

all of the Olympus monies coming from the East
High job with Mayne and that it had no obligation
to allow Olympus any proceeds of the checks if it so
elected. The evidence does not support its position.
On the contrary, the evidence is clear that, after the
rhecks were delivered, Olympus and the Plaintiff
would then negotiate, future negotiations, as to the
portion each would receive, which was done on all
prior issued checks, and the pro rate was never the
same.

This was necessary to enable Olympus to complete its contract with Mayne for it had to pay other
suppliers for materials used on the job, its labor
force, overhead, and the purchase of equipment.
(Stott dep. R 12, 22-25)
The testimony of both Mr. Williams, Plaintiff's
Division Manager, and Mr. Stott, of Olympus, who
represented their respective companies in providing
future negotiations and for the arrangement of
joint payees, is substantially the same.
QUESTIONS BY MR. DAINES TO MR. WILLIAMS

Q.
A.

And what was done with the money, with
each check?
Well, as much as possible I would try to
get as much of it as I could. I controlled
the checks. Our agreement was that
Clark - Mr. Stott again - would bring
those down, and I know on two occasions,
and I can't remember on the others, we
went to the bank together and endorsed
7

these, and I got a cashier's check for our
amount, and then we issued - I think
this is how we did it - we issued them a
check, one of our own checks.
Q. Now, I take it that on each check that
was issued by the Mayne people, you
yourselves, meaning, of course, Pacific
and Olympus, that you and Mr. Stott negotiated between you how much money
that the Pacific Metals would receive
from the check and how much would be
received - how much Pacific Metals
would get?
A. Yes.
Q. That was the understanding or agreement you had when you and Mr. Stott
entered into the arrangement where both
names would appear as co-payees, was
it not?
A. Yes.
Q. That after the check was issued, that
then you representing Pacific Metals and
Mr. Stott representing the Olympus
Heating and Air Conditioning would negotiate the amount that each company
was to receive?
A. Yes.
Q. And that's what you did with reference
to all of the checks which were issued
prior to the check of October 18, 1965 A. As I recall.
(Williams' dep. R 7-8)
Q. Well this check was also - the amount
received by you and the amount received
8

A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Mr.

Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

by the Olympus people was subject to
negotiation, wasn't it?
It was subject to negotiation, but I was
the controlling factor on it. If I had demanded all of it, I wouldn't have put my
endorsement on it until the agreement
had been reached.
And he didn't have to put his endorsement on it until he arrived at an understanding, did he?
Then it would have been a standstill.
I see.
But our agreement was that this would
come to us. This is - better not say anything.
(Williams' dep R. 21-22)
Greenwood
So as to any money paid on a joint payee
check, the debtor - your signature has
to appear along with that of the debtor?
Yes, sir.
Now, you stated in answer to a previous
question that the agreement with Mr.
Stott was that you would control their
disposition of checks made payable jointly to Olympus and Pacific Metals?
Yes.
Now, what do you mean by "control"?
Well, maybe that's an improper word to
use. I don't know. That he couldn't just
promiscuously come down and say, "Here
is five hundred bucks on account", or
9

something to that effect. That I would
have to have a fair amount of the check
made out payable jointly to us or if - J
can't remember our conversation. I am
sure that I would have tried to get it all
if at all possible because an indebtedness
was owed to us, and my prime responsibility to our company was to collect that
indebtedness.
Q. Well, now, referring - could you have
taken it all on these previous checks?
MR. DAINES: Object to that as leading and
suggestive and calls for a conclusion.
Q. Well, was there - let me ask you this:
Was there any conversation with respect
to your taking all of any particular check
on these joint payee checks?
A. Oh, as I recall, I am sure that I - one
occasion I know I tried to get more than
what I eventually took, which I can't remember the exact amount, but we all
knew that he was in financial difficulty,
or there would be no need for this in the
first place, and consequently it was a
matter of who could get - if I could get
more, I would, but I didn't want to close
the man out.
Q. Was there any specific agreement to pay
a portion of this check to Olympus?
A. No. There was no pre-arranged discussions of who would get what out of a
check until the time actually came that
he had a check in his hand.
(William R. 23-24)
This was also the substance of the testimony of Mr. Stott of Olympus.
10

QUESTION BY MR. MESERVY

Q.
A.

Q.

What was the general context of the conversation?
Well, mainly, that I did agree with him
that - and we also contacted D i c k
Brown of Mayne Plumbing and Heating
- and asked if it would be okay with
them if they would make out the joint
checks or that the checks, jointly, with
Olympus Heating and Pacific Metals,
and Dick Brown agreed that this would
be all right with him, thus enabling us
to continue to complete the job and do
the job.
But our conversation, to a certain
extent, was, that we, in allowing them to
have joint check - that there would be
times when, of course, we had to cover
our payroll and had to cover other suppliers, that we would possibly require
some of that money, depending upon how
our collections on other jobs came in; and
there was several checks up prior to this
particular check that we are concerned
with here, that we did divide the proceeds on.
But this wasn't a fixed amount on
any particular check; and it was more or
less based, each time, upon what the balance of the account showed with Pacific
Metals.
(Deposition of Mr. Stott R. 5-6)
Now Mr. Stott, you have already testified you don't recall, specifically the language at the discussion. At the conclusion
11

of the discussion, what was your under.
standing as to when the entire balance
of the indebtedness to Pacific Metals
would be paid off?
MR. DAINES: Just one moment - we object; that is suggestive and is leading; fur.
ther, it calls for a conclusion of the witness
and not as to what the agreement was.
'
MR. CHRISTIAN: May I further object on
the ground, it would not - what his understanding is would not be binding upon the
Bank of Salt Lake.
MR. DAINES: Nor is it binding upon Tracy.
Collins Bank & Trust Company.
MR. GREENWOOD: You may answer.
A. Well, I believe this is correct. I believe
that we used the job, like I say, with the
provision that there was other material
men; there was labor to be paid by whatever profits, and so forth, that would be
forthcoming from the job; and, of course,
this is an amount that you couldn't put
your finger on; but our agreement was,
we would utilize the joint check system
to purchase the materials that were need·
ed for the job and to pay off the old in·
debtedness.
But I don't recall, specifically, whe·
ther we said, "Well, you would have all
of the money," or completely pay off all
of the account because I am sure that the
Pacific Metals, or anyone else, would re·
alize there are other material - men and
labor to be paid; and, like I say, I just
don't remember the exact conversation;
12

but, other than that, we were trying to
secure our position, and, then, the account.
Q. Now, isn't it true that, in that discussion,
it was discussed that the account would
be paid in full out of your MR. DAINES: Just a moment - we object
to that; it is suggestive and leading.
A. Well, out of what realized, out of that
particular job.
Q. Out of this particular job; that the account with the Pacific Metals would be
paid in full at the conclusion of the job?
A. I don't know as to whether this was stated, specifically. I believe our conversation was nothing along the lines that we
would attempt to do this, but whether it
was a definite conclusion that we would
be able to do it, I don't - I just don't
recall; and I'm sure that we had the understanding that we would attempt to do
this.
Q. This, then, was discussed in the meeting?
A. Well, I believe something along these
lines, yes. I believe this was - was an
attempt to clean up the account and in
full.
Q. Now, in reference to the joint-payee
checks, you mentioned that there was an
indication and discussion at the time that
there would be certain times when you
would need portions of the checks; was
there anything discussed as to what basis would determine what portions you
received?
13

A.

No.

Q.

W?o was to control what portion you received?

MR. DAINES: We object to that; that calls
for suggestive and leading - calls for a conclusion. Why don't we have the conversation
about it?

Q.

A.

Was there anything in reference to the
discussion that you had which related to
who would control the portion that you
were to receive out of each check?
No. I believe, that, each time the check
was received, that Mr. Williams and myself would get together on that particular check and arrive at a satisfactory
conclusion, so there was nothing - nothing set in; it was all just a matter of negotiations on an individual-check basis.
(Deposition of Mr. Stott R 9-11)

Since all Plaintiff had was a right to negotiate
with Olympus as to the amount it would receive
from each check after issuance and delivery, this
agreement falls because of uncertainty and inde·
finiteness, and Tracy's Motion for Summary J udg·
ment should have been granted and Plaintiff's de·
nied.
There was never an assignment of any interest
from Olympus to Plaintiff. (Williams' deposition
R. 4)
A check does not operate as an assignment of
any part of a fund.
14

Inasmuch as the transaction, upon which this
action is brought, occurred in October 1965, the Negotiable Instruments Law is applicable rather than
the Commercial Code. The pertinent provisions of
the N.I.L. as incorporated into the Utah Code, 1953,
Annotated, provide as follows:
44-3-2. "Check" defined. - A check is a bill
of exchange drawn on a bank, payable on demand. Except as herein otherwise provided,
the provisions of this title applicable to a bill
of exchange payable on demand apply to a
check.
44-2-2. Bill not an asignment of funds in
hands of drawee. - A bill of itself does not
operate as an assignment of the funds in the
hands of the drawee available for the payment thereof, and the drawee is not liable on
the bill unless and until he accepts the same.
As to non-assignability of funds by a check,
AM JUR 2nd states the law is as follows:
Under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Act, the provision, which has been applied in
a number of cases, is that a check, of itself,
does not operate as an assignment of any part
of the funds to the credit of the drawer with
the Bank. The provision of the Uniform Commercial Code is substantially the same. It is
therein provided that a check or other draft
does not of itself operate as an assignment of
any funds in the hands of the drawee available for its payment." 10 AM JUR 2nd Page
531, Sec. 562.
For Plaintiff to recover against Tracy it must
15

establish that it owned the check or proceeds thereof, and if not, then it has no right to action against
this Defendant, and its recourse is against Olympus
for the agreed value of the materials supplied:
American National Bank vs. First National Bank,
277 Pac. 2nd 951, 130 Colo. 557 (1954); Hi-Way
Motor Co. vs. Service Motor Co., 68 Utah 65, 249,
Pac. 133; Mullner vs. McCromic & Co., Banker, 69
Utah 557, 257 Pac. 658.
Since there was no agreement between Pacific
Metals and Olympus as to the amount each would
receive, and, that the amount would be determined
after delivery, by negotiation, Pacific Metals had no
right to its possesion or ownership.
A contract which relies upon future negotiation
as to its terms is void for uncertainty, 17 AM JUR
2nd, page 362, Section 26, and the definiteness of a
contract is determined as of the time it is made, 17
AM JUR 2nd, Page 415 Sec. 76. In order to be bind·
ing, a contract must be definite and certain as to its
terms.
"It is fundamental that no person may be
subjected by law to a contractual obligation,
unless the character of the obligation is de·
finitely fixed by an express or implied. ag~ee·
ment of the parties. In order to be bmdmg,
an agreement must be definite and certain~
to its terms and requirements; it must identi·
fy the subject matter and spell out the. essen·
tial commitments and agreements with re·
spect thereto," 17 AM JUR 2nd, Pages 413·
414, Sec. 75.
16

and in this regard and as to future negotiations,
this Court said in Hi-Way Motor Co. vs. Service Mof,.or Co., supra:

"It is no doubt true that, unless the minds of
Hyrum Jensen and the manager of appellant
had fully met respecting all of the essential
terms of the alleged contract for the sale of
the Ford sedan and the purchase of the Star
sedan, the alleged contract failed of consummation, and hence appellant cannot recover
damages for a breach thereof, nor can it sustain an action of trover for the value of the
old sedan. It certainly is true that:
In order that theatre may be an agreement,
the parties must have a distinct intention
common to both and without doubt or difference. Until all understand alike, there can
be no assent, and, therefore, no contract.
Both parties must assent to the same thing in
the same sense, and their minds must meet
as to all the terms." 13 C.J. 263, paragraph
48.

Further:
"Where the parties have left an essential part
of the agreement for future determination,
it is no doubt correct to say that the contract
is not completed." 6 R.C.L. p. 643, paragraph
59.
"It seems entirely unnecessary to multiply
authority upon a proposition so elementary as
the one here in question, and we shall refrain
from doing so." (underscoring added)
17

As we have pointed out, the check did not
amount to an assignment of any funds, nor was
there an equitable assignment, as the test of an e 4 ui~
table assignment is whether a debtor would be justified in paying a debt to the person claiming to be
the assignee (6 AM JUR 2nd, Page 266, Sec. 83),
and the transfer must be of such a character that
the fund holder can safely pay the assignee and may
be compelled to do so although forbidden by the assignor. Christmas vs. Russel, 20 L.Ed. 762, Long vs.
Farmers State Bank, 147 F. 360. This would also
apply in determining whether or not the Plaintiff
had any property interest in the check. In other
words, could Pacific Metals have made a demand on
Mayne to pay all of the proceeds of a check directly
to it, omitting Olympus as a co-payee of the check1
Assuming that Mayne had omitted Pacific Metals as co-payee on the check it would not have had
a claim against Mayne, for it could not have been
determined and it cannot now be determined how
much of the money represented by the check Pacific
Metals was intitled to.
Plaintiff had no ownership in the check, nor
was it entitled to possession at the time of the alleged
conversion, the rule is that Plaintiff must be the
owner or that he is in possession or entitled to possession at the time of the alleged wrong. None of
these facts exist here. Hi-Way Motor Co. vs. Service
Motor Co. (Utah) supra; National Producers Dis·
18

tributors, Inc., vs. Miles & Myers, Inc., 75 Idaho
460, 274 Pac. 831.
POINT II
IN THE ALTERNATE, THE COURT ERRED
IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
IN HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES
NOT PRESENT AN ISSUE OF FACT FOR
THE DETERMINATION BY A TRYER OF
THE FACTS.

While it is our position the evidence is clear
there was no agreement between Pacific Metals and
Olympus giving Pacific Metals the ownership of the
proceeds of the check, and our Motion of Summary
Judgment should have been granted and Pacific
Metals' denied, if the Court believes otherwise, then
we assert the evidence presents an issue of fact to
be determined by the Trial Court as to whether or
not Pacific Metals was its owner, or was Pacific
Metals limited to a right to negotiate, in the future,
as to what portion of the funds of each check it was
entitled to? Should the latter be determined to be
the agreement, then Pacific Metals would have no
right of recovery, as hereinbefore pointed out.
The law is plain that a Summary Judgment
should not be granted if there is any genuine issue
of fact to be tried.
As stated in Young vs. Felornia, (Utah) 244
P. 2d 862, 121 Utah 646:
"In respect to a summary judgment, Rule
56 ( c) U.R.C.P. provides:
'The judgment sought shall be rendered
19

fort~w~th if th~ pleadings, depositions and
a?m1~s10ns on file, together with the affida-

v1 ts, if any, show that there is no genuine
issu~ as to an.y material fact, and that the
movmg party is entitled to a judgment, as a
mater of law.'
Under this rule, it is clear that if thel'e
is any genuine issue as to any material fact
the motion should be denied."
'
Not only is this the rule, but it is also the rule
that every inference fairly arising from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits is to be
given in favor of the one against whom the motion
for summary judgment is asked.
This Court stated in Morris vs. Farns·
worth Motel et al, 259 P. 2nd 297, 123 Utah 289:
"Under such circumstances, the party against
whom the summary judgment is granted, is
entitled to the benefit of having the Court
consider all the facts presented and every in·
f erence fairly arising therefrom in the light
most favorable to him, which we do in review·
ing the incident."
And summary judgment must be denied if con·
flicting inferences can be drawn from the evidence
and if reasonable men might reach different con·
clusions:
"To justify the summary judgment, it mu~t
appear that the evidence entered in oppos1·
tion thereto is either too incredible to be ac·
cepted by reasonable minds or is without legal
probative force. Summary judgment must be
20

if the evidence is such that conflicting
mferences could be drawn therefrom or if
reasonable men might reach different conclusions. (3 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Barron and Holtzoff, Sec. 1234,
Page 135-136)"
~lenied

and
"And one who moves for summary judgment
has the burden of demonstrating clearly that
there is no genuine issue of fact. Any doubt
as to the existence of such an issue is resolved
against him. The evidence presented at the
hearing is liberally construed in favor of the
party opposing the Motion and he is given the
benefit of all favorable inferences which
might reasonably be drawn from the evidence.
Facts asserted by the party opposing the Motion and supported by Affidavits or other evidentiary material, must be taken as true. (3
FEDERAL PRACTICE A N D PROCEDURE, Barron and Holtzoff, Sec. 1235, Pages
139-141."
further
"The fact that both parties have moved for
summary judgment does not establish that
there is no issue of fact. A party may concede
that there is no issue if his legal theory is accepted and yet maintain that there is a genuine dispute as to material facts if his opponent's theory is adopted. Thus, both motions
should be denied if the Court finds that there
is actually a genuine issue as to a material
fact. If both parties move for summary judgment each concedes and affirms that there is
no is~ue of fact only for purposes of his own
motion. (3 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
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PROCEDURE, Barron and Holtzoff Sec
1239, P. 176-177)"
'
,
While we urge that a consideration of the testi.
mony submitted in the depositions of Mr. Williams
and Mr. Stott establishes that their agreement was
to the effect that all Plaintiff had was a future
right of negotiation as to what each would receive
from the checks, and such agreement was void for
uncertainly, if the Court believes otherwise, we sub·
mit there was a material issue of fact for determination by the Trial Court, which could not be dis·
posed of on a motion for summary judgment as to
just what the agreement of the parties was, that is,
whether Pacific Metals owned all of the proceeds of
the check, or was the amount it was to receive to be
subsequently agreed upon.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out herein, Appellant Tracy-Collnis Bank and Trust Company respectfully
prays the Court to set aside and vacate said sum·
mary judgment and direct the Trial Court to grant
Tracy-Collins' motion for summary judgment, or,
in the alternate, to remand the cause for trial.
Respectfully submitted,
L. DELOS DAINES
FRED L. FINLINSON
Attorneys for Appellant
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